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‘Brexit hammer: Clowns in UK, USA’  
 
   




Abstract: The global revival of economic nationalism and protectionism poses a serious threat 
to the international foreign trade policy orientation towards principles of a market economy. 
Popular economic nationalism such as Trumpism, Brexit or the isolation of the Eastern 
European Visegrád states from immigrants violates fundamental principles of the WTO. 
Economists agree that Brexit will hurt the UK economy significantly in the medium and long 
term. In addition, its political and economic effects will damage the US and transatlantic 
relations. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, on the other hand, continues to claim that 
leaving the EU will enable Britain to "take back control". In addition, the socio-economic 
effects of the Corona crisis on the US, UK, EU and transatlantic relations are devastating. It has 
far-reaching political, social and economic consequences that go well beyond public health. All 
partners need each other more than ever to cope with the Covid crisis. Increased transatlantic 
cooperation to strengthen resilience would also be necessary in closely related areas of 
international relations and security issues.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The British voted 52 % to 48 % in favour of leaving the European Union (EU) in a 
referendum on 23 June 2016. The Brexit rules in force since 31 January 2020 are likely to 
hurt the British economy in the medium and long term according to most economists and 
economist literature. Since the expiration of the transition period on 31 December 2020, the 
United Kingdom (UK) is no longer part of the European Union Customs Union and the 
European Single Market. Yet, the full scale of the damage, hitting trade and deepening labour 
shortages, is still uncertain, because the impact is overloaded by the economic effect of the 
Covid-19 pandemic (Giles, 2021). 
 
 





















The Brexit effects became visible first concerning the trade in goods. But the estimated 
impact depends largely on which statistics are used. According to the UK’s Office for 
National Statistics (ONS), exports to the EU were 5 % lower in April 2021 than last 
December but cut by 24 % when measured by Eurostat over the same period (Giles, 2021). 
Likewise, the value of imports of trade in goods from the EU to the UK was 19 % down over 
the same period, according to the ONS, while Eurostat recorded only a 13 % decline.  
 
Brexit induced deregulation could benefit businesses only to a limited extent because the UK 
had already the second-lowest value of the OECD Product Market Regulation and held the 
6th position in the World Bank's Doing Business ranking. The regulation of network 
industries was the least restrictive among OECD countries (Kierzenkowski et al 2016).  
 
Yet, economists generally agree about the long term Brexit effects, e.g about a reduction of 
British GDP by about 4 %, compared with remaining inside the EU. For the years to come, 
much depends on the degree of supply chain ruptures between Britain and the EU-27 as well 




   
Source: Giles, 2021, FT  
Moreover, the new restrictions concerning labour movement, introduced with Brexit, limiting 
the rights of EU citizens to come and work in Britain, raised concerns about labour shortages 
(Giles, 2021). Though, here again, it is difficult to differentiate. Labour shortages resulted 
from an impact mix of the Covid-crisis and Brexit. There were similar trends observed in 
other EU countries which suggested that it was not solely a Brexit effect. Employers had to 
realize in some sectors such as social care that the times when they could expect labour to be 
freely available were over and that on the contrary, they needed to pay more to ensure 
available staff (Giles, 2021).  
 




















Advocates of Brexit like Premier Boris Johnson claimed that leaving the EU would enable 
Britain to “take back control.” But then, the benefits of Brexit for the UK are not evident 
either. London rapidly rolled over many trade agreements with countries that already had 
dealt with the EU. The then foreign affairs minister, Boris Johnson, promised already before 
the Brexit vote in 2016 a ‘titanic success’ of the envisaged CANZUK union with the former 
white settler colonies of the British empire, meant to replace the lost EU market (Kohnert, 
2021). However, economists are sceptical about the positive net effect of the deal. Even the 
British government’s impact assessment suggested a total gain of just 0.02 % in the long run 
(Giles, 2021).  
 
However, recently the British got amazed about a perceived ‘Corona miracle’. When Boris 
Johnson confirmed the end of almost all COVID-19 restrictions on 19 July 2021, gloomy 
forecasts were abounding. Epidemiologist Neil Ferguson from the Imperial College London, a 
member of the Covid advisory board SAGE, warned that an increase to 100,000 or even 
200,000 new infections per day would be almost inevitable (Plickert, 2021). Yet, infections up 
to now did not increase substantially. On the contrary, at the beginning of August 2021, 
almost 22,000 new infections were reported and hospital admissions, as well as death, also 
increased only moderately since July.  
 
Yet, the question remains if the protection by the high vaccination rate of the British will last. 
Almost 73 % of adults received two doses of the vaccine and 89 % one dose. According to the 
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British Office for National Statistics (ONS) in Newport (Wales), nine out of ten adults have 
antibodies against Covid, either because they have been vaccinated or have recovered.  
 
Graph 3: Post-Brexit UK trade in goods with non-EU countries surpassed that with EU,  
1
st
 quarter 2021  
 
 
Source: The Guardian, Partington, 2021  
 
Graph 4: Confirmed COVID-cases in the UK, March 2020 to August 2021  
  
UK COVID-19, google news. Data Source: John Hopkins Univ.  
 
Moreover, the UK is likely to start a marvellous economic recovery. According to IMF 
forecasts Britain will show one of the world’s highest growth rates with about 7 % in 2021. 
Thus, the pre-COVID-19 crisis level could be reached again by the end of 2021 according to 
the Bank of England (Plickert, 2021).  
 
In the following, I should like to focus on the combined impact of Brexit and the COVID-19 
pandemic on the US and transatlantic relations. The revival of popular economic nationalism 
and protection like Brexit, Trumpism and the foreclosure of the East-European Visegrád 
countries against migrants, constitutes a serious threat to free trade and free markets 
worldwide. It will weaken especially the Western hemisphere that up to now upheld, if not 
guaranteed, economic liberal positions in world trade. Furthermore, the socio-economic 
impact of the Corona crisis on the US and transatlantic relations has been devasting far 
beyond public health. Enhanced transatlantic cooperation to strengthen resilience would be 




2.  Impact of Brexit and the COVID-19 crisis on the USA  
 
2.1 The impact of Brexit on the USA  
 
Cartoon 2: A new era between Great Britain and the U.S. after Brexit?  
Theresa May's and Donald Trump's "Special Relationship".  
 
   




The worldwide revival of popular economic nationalism and protection is a serious threat to 
the internationally shared policy orientation on foreign trade on the principles of a market 
economy. This preference had generally prevailed since the end of World War II, e.g. 
concerning the WTO, founded in 1995, its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT, 1948), as well as the OECD, established in 1961 by 38 high-income 
economies. The consensus had been justified by two assumptions of economic theory: first, 
the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage and second, a central theorem of international 
relations, namely the notion that the removal of trade barriers would promote a positive 
correlative relationship between economic integration, development and peace (Stacy, 2021).  
 
Popular economic nationalism, like Trumpism 
4
, Brexit or the foreclosure of the four East-
European Visegrád countries against immigrants arguably contravenes against the following 
five fundamental WTO principles :  
1. Non-discrimination, including the most favoured nation (MFN) rule and the national 
treatment policy, was introduced to tackle non-tariff barriers to trade.   
2. Reciprocity, to limit the scope of free-riding and a desire to obtain better access to 
foreign markets, providing that the gain would be greater than the gain available from 
unilateral liberalization.  
3. Binding and enforceable commitments.  
4. Transparency through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM)  
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5. Safety values applying in specific circumstances to restrict free trade, e.g.to protect the 
environment and public health (WTO, Wikipedia). 
 
London’s Brexit decision and Donald Trump’s aggressive position toward the WTO 
(Linscott, 2020) were likely to restrict the free world market consensus. Besides, both 
encouraged populistic political national isolation worldwide (Stacy, 2021).   
 
Britain is a major US trade and economic ally. It is the largest trading partner by country, 
accounting for 16.7 % of total UK trade, while the EU is its largest overall partner. Moreover, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and connected activities are key aspects of bilateral ties 
(Akhtar et al, 2021). The Brexit required not only a new EU trade agreement with the UK but 
also a new US-UK free trade agreement. Britain's withdrawal from the EU caused uncertainty 
for American firms exporting and operating in the UK, given the high degree of 
interdependence between EU and UK trade and investment and the role of the UK as a 
stepping stone to the EU market. Although many American enterprises were relieved that, 
after years of uncertainty, London and Brussels had finally avoided a ‘hard Brexit’ and did 
not fell back on WTO terms, many US enterprises in Britain had already begun restructuring 
their operations due to Brexit. Experts expected post-Brexit UK’s growth to shrink in the 
long-term, compared with Britain remaining in the EU, this the more so, because of additional 
negative effects of the Corona crisis (Akhtar et al, 2021).  
 
According to a recent evaluation by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the UK is 
likely to remain one of its closest and most reliable allies of the US, a partnership based on 
common history, values, language and culture. According to the study, Brexit would be 
unlikely to cause any drastic overhaul of the general British – American relationship. It would 
continue for the foreseeable future, not only in economic issues, but also concerning NATO, 
intelligence, counterterrorism, and other global and regional security challenges. 
Nevertheless, the CRS recognized a controversial debate about the question of whether 
Britain's global role and impact are likely to be improved or weakened by Brexit. Unlike 
President Donald Trump, an outspoken supporter of Brexit, former president Barack Obama, 
as well as current president Joe Biden and his administration, so far have been sceptical (Mix, 
2021). In 2020, Washington and London conducted five rounds of negotiations on a bilateral 
free trade agreement, the negotiations are ongoing.  
 
Graph 5: Breakdown of UK imports by country and origin (in %)  
 
   
Source: Cornuet, F. et al (2019)  
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As of 30 July 2021, total bilateral UK-US trade in goods and services (exports and imports) 
was £ 188.1 bn in the year to the end of the first quarter of 2021, a decrease of 17.8 % or £ 
40.9 bn from the year before. Total UK exports to the US decreased by 17.7 %, total UK 
imports by 18.1%. In 2019, the outward stock of FDI from the UK in the US was £ 379.7 bn 
or 25.3 % of the total British outward FDI stock. The UK inward FDI stock was £ 381.6 bn, 
or 24.5% of the total inward stock (Trade and Investment factsheet, USA, DIT, London, 
2021). British service industries were predominant. They accounted for 80 % of total 
economic output and more than 80 % of employment. The bilateral UK - US investment 
relationship is regarded as the biggest in the world. The five leading export destinations in 
2019 were the USA, Germany, Netherlands, France and Ireland, the principal five import 
countries, the USA, Germany, Netherlands, China and France (Mix, 2021).  
 
Graph 6: Composition of UK imports and exports by country of origin  
 
Source: Cornuet, F. et al (2019) p. 40 
 
London remained especially ambitious concerning security and defence issues. Britain and 
America were key partners in terms of defence industry cooperation and defence sales, 
counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. Besides, they cooperate through the Five Eyes 
alliance, an intelligence partnership that includes Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In 
2020, the UK had - with approximately US$ 61.5 bn - the world’s fourth-largest military 







Graph 7: National & imported content of exports from trading partners to the UK  
  
Source: Cornuet, F. et al (2019), p. 41  
 
Even if Brexit would restore Britain’s former global importance, the geopolitical conditions 
have changed fundamentally. The high-flying illusions of the Brexiteers about a revival of the 
glory of imperial Britain would be difficult to realize. Although visions of ‘Global Britain’ 
form a common cultural inheritance, not just of Brexiteers, but of English voters in general, 
they tend to disregard the consequences of decolonisation (Saunders, 2020). 
 





Source: Transatlantic relations, Wikipedia  
 
Brexit not just weakened the EU but split and undermined the Western alliance too. This, the 
more so as the Trans-Atlantic, the centre of global geopolitics for centuries, moved slowly but 
surely to the Trans-Pacific. Certainly, London saw the writing on the wall and tried to 
reorientate its foreign policy. One consequence was that the British endorsed the idea of 
CANZUK, i.e. a union between the UK, and it's former 'white settler colonies' Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, to replace the lost access to the EU-27 market. The CANZUK 
was embedded in a vision of the revival of the olden days of Great Britain and its role in the 
‘Anglosphere’, dating back to World War II and 19th-century British settler colonialism. 
However, it is rather doubtful whether the CANZUK will become the ‘titanic success’ which 
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 One possible definition of transatlantic relations. The US (in red), Canada (in green), the EU (before Brexit; in 
blue). European non-EU states, Latin America and Africa were excluded (Transatlantic relations, Wikipedia).  
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Boris Johnson promised already in 2016 when he still was minister of foreign affairs 
(Kohnert, 2021).  
 
Apparently, the centre of Britain’s post-Brexit economic and political interests will remain in 
Europe, last, but not least, because of the implications for Northern Ireland and Scotland. Yet, 
with the split from the EU London transmitted a seed of contention among Europeans. In fact, 
it weakened the very foundations of post-war European unification, the partial transfer of 
national sovereignty to attain a greater mutual impact. But also the remaining EU-27 has 
changed already substantially with the growth of nationalist populism in an increasing number 
of member states. In this respect, Brexit was arguably just an accelerant (Bevington, 2021).  
 
Nevertheless, a less ambitious British government, that would not concentrate on the 
restoration of a post-Brexit (imperial) ‘Global Britain’, could still play an eminent role in 
European foreign relations and world politics. Namely, as a powerful permanent member of 
the UN Security Council and non-partisan mediator in international relations, equipped with a 
‘robust mandate’. Thereby London should focus on human rights, democratization and 
development assistance for least developed countries, in profiting from its strong international 
connections to most of the political leaders of the world.  
 
Last, but not least, the paradoxical consequences of a new exclusive bilateral UK – US trade 
deal will probably provoke the erection of one of the major single trade barriers in current 
foreign trade history, quite to the contrary of London’s repeated commitment to promoting 
free trade (Bevington, 2021).  
 
Graph 9: Trans-Pacific (TPP-11)  
 
  




                                                 
6
 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, created in January 2018 by its 
member states:  Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and 
Vietnam. The TPP-11 evolved from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which never entered into force due to 
the withdrawal of the United States under the Trump government. Other Pacific Rim countries including Korea, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Taiwan also have an interest in the TPP Agreement and may participate in the 
TPP Agreement in the future. Source: Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP 
Agreement), HARAKENZO, Intellectual Property Information.  
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What is to be expected from a future bilateral UK – US trade deal? Former President Trump, 
who was like-minded with the British Premier Johnson, had promised a ‘phenomenal’ post-
Brexit deal. But it was by no means clear that Washington would honour the traditional 
'special relationship' with one of its closest allies and agree to a mutually beneficial treaty. 
Here too, the maxim ‘America first’ prevailed (Ellyatt, 2019). Washington wanted for 
example substantial access to the protected British agricultural market and to the cherished 
National Health Service (NHS) that was to be opened up to American pharmaceutical and 
medical companies. However, both demands would be to the detriment of British farmers and 
consumers, e.g. concerning transatlantic differences in product and food standards, and cause 
vehement protest of the concerned, notably because of the additional impact of the Corona 
crisis (Beverley-Smith &Jefferies, 2020).  
 
 
2.2 The socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the USA  
 
The Corona crisis created not just a public health calamity but an economic emergency too. 
As of 9 August 2021, there were a total of 35.812.164 COVID-19 confirmed cases, including 
616.594 death, as well as 166.477.481 completely vaccinated people (50,5 %) (USA, COVID-
19, google news). Thus, the pandemic claimed more than three times the American lives that 
were lost in the Vietnam War (Bauer, 2020). As for the regional distribution the virus spread 
from the densely populated urban centres to more rural parts of the country. The most death 
were to be deplored in the South-East, South-West and the Far West (see Tab. 10). 
Concerning ethnicity, Blacks (African Americans; about 47 million or 14.2% of the total US 
population) and non-white Hispanos (1.5 m, 0.5%) had been affected most (see Graph 14).  
 
Graph 10: Confirmed COVID-cases USA, January 2020 to July 2021  
   
USA COVID-19, google news, accessed: 9 August 2021  
 
Graph 11: vaccinations USA as % of the total population, January 2021 to July 2021  
(dark blue – completely vaccinated; light blue, one dose ) 
   





According to a scholarly analysis of the potential economic impact of the pandemic, the latent 
three most harmful sectors concerning the economic impact were manufacturing, professional 
services, as well as leisure and hospitality. The former two sectors showed the most sizable 
initial shocks according to a model calculation. The latter sector, although smaller in size, 
contributed roughly the same extent to the total output decrease because of its large initial 
shock. However, the authors of the analysis cautioned that the explanatory power of the 
modelling was limited because the impact of price- or wage changes as well as the possibility 
of failed industries was not considered. For regions in which no industries stopped working, 
the pandemic was likely to exert – according to the prognosis – a reduction of about 9 % of 
the sector’s output, whereas the total American GDP fell by an annual rate of 31.7 % in the 
second quarter of 2020, which corresponded to a 9 % quarterly reduction. The latter 
corresponded with the data reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (Barlow & 
Vodenska, 2021). In March 2020 there was a sharp initial reduction of economic output, 
followed by a gradual recovery up to March 2021, reaching the pre-Corona levels.  
 
Graph 12:  distribution of African-Americans in the USA   
 
  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey 2019; African Americans, Wikipedia  
 
Other things being equal, women and girls were affected disproportionately economically, 
impacting women’s income, employment, and education chances. Moreover, they were 
burdened with the mounting pressure of unpaid care for their relatives and last, but not least, 
they suffered from gender-based violence (Tang, 2021).  
 
According to an analysis of the Brookings Institution, the following ten facts marked the 
economic impact of the Corona crisis on the US economy in its initial stage (Bauer, 2020):  
 
(1)  Small business revenue was down 20 % since January 2020  
(2)  Only chapter 11 bankruptcies had increased relative to 2019  
(3)  New business formations fell off in the spring but were on track to outpace recent 
years  
(4)  Layoffs and shutdowns – and not reduced average hours – were driving in total 
hours worked  
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(5)  The number of labour force participation not at work quadrupled from January to 
April 2020  
(6)  The number of people not in the labour force who wanted a job spiked by 4.5 m in 
April and remained elevated  
(7)  In April 2020 the U.S. personal savings rate reached its highest recorded level  
(8)  Low-income families with children were most likely to experience an income 
shock  
(9)  In 26 states, more than one in five households was behind on rent in July 2020  
(10)  From 2018 to mid-2020, the rate of food insecurity doubled for households 
with children.  
 
Graph 13: COVID-19 weekly death by US region, March to August 2020 
 
  
Source: Bauer, et al, 2020 
 
Graph 14: COVID-19 death rates by race, ethnicity and age, February to August 2020  
 
 






3.  Impact of Brexit and Corona crisis on the transatlantic 
Partnership   
 
3.1 The impact of Brexit on the transatlantic Partnership  
 
 
Cartoon 3: ‚A Post-Brexit world‘  
 
  




Brexit will cause in the medium and long term a major negative shock, not just to the UK 
and EU. Also, the EU 27 might play a new role in the debate over, and practice of, the 
reform of world order after Brexit (Higgott R. (2021). Already for a long time, the EU had 
a growing interest and engagement not only in China but with North-East Asia as a whole, 
driven by the post-colonial commitments of the UK and France and the mainly commercial 
interests of Germany. Moreover, Washington exerts increasing pressure on the EU to take 
sides in its rising tensions with China. Therefore, also China’s neighbours have been 
watching closely how London and Brussels respond to the US demand and how they 
manage their future relations with the region (Higgott R. (2021).  
 
The political and economic fallout of Brexit will affect the rest of the OECD too, including 
the USA, although to a much lesser extend. Traditionally, Britain has been used as a 
gateway or stepping stone for American businesses intending to trade or invest in the EU. 
Brexit will force many US companies to pay double tariffs on goods exported to the UK 
and then re-exported to the EU (GoCardless, 2020).   
 
However, Brexit might reveal as a driver of populist nationalism and a Balkanization of 
post-Brexit Europe and beyond, including authoritarianism and illegitimate interference 
into the political electoral process. Because of a possible domino effect, more and more 
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voters, notably the deprived and those threatened by the loss of social and economic status 
accelerated by the predicted Brexit induced economic downturn, could develop a mounting 
distrust of the political establishment. Then they become easy prey for gamblers like 
Donald Trump or Maine Le Pen who offer them facts and fancy, thereby undermining the 
very conditions of social, economic and political stability, a vicious circle, difficult to stop 
(Foroohar, 2016). If the EU, one of the world's largest trading blocs, is gradually 
disintegrating, this could have repercussions on trade deals worldwide and promote global 
uncertainty (Gillespie, 2016).  
 
Graph 15: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)  
  
OECD member states. [dark blue]; founding member states, [light blue]   
Source: OECD, Wikipedia  
 
Last, but not least, Brexit might trigger self-interested and closed off national policies not 
only in the UK but also e.g. in Eastern Europe. This could result, similar to Trump’s approach 
to international affairs, in a radicalization of political partisanship, denying climate change, 
cancelling the membership in the Paris Climate Agreement, withdrawal from the WHO and 
negotiations about a nuclear deal with Iran (James, 2020).  
 
Besides, Europeans cannot hope for a return to the transatlantic security partnership of 
yesterday. Washington's call for increased burden-sharing concerning NATO and more 
European strategic autonomy won’t cease (James, 2020). However, this corresponds also to 
the conservative nationalistic European security policy which has been implemented already 
in the French-led European Intervention Initiative, the British-French Combined Joint 
Expeditionary Force and the UK Joint Expeditionary Force (James, 2020). 
 
Finally, Brexit could affect the migration of American’s into the UK negatively. New 
immigration rules for non-UK nationals are likely to cause difficulties for any US 
companies with branches in the UK and the EU-27 (GoCardless, 2020). Before Brexit, US 
immigrants had raised British GDP growth significantly (Kierzenkowski et al 2016). They 
had higher employment rates and also a better education than the average British 
employee. Also, they contributed to the public finances, despite relying on the  British 
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 Average net direct fiscal contribution of households by migration status of the household head, 2007-2009 








Source: Kierzenkowski et al 2016  
 
 
Graph 17: US immigrants employed in the UK  
(% of population aged 16-64, 2015)  
 
 
 Source: Kierzenkowski et al 2016  
 
As for the stagnant TTIP negotiations, the Council of the European Union had granted the 
European Commission two negotiating mandates on April 15, 2019. First, to (re) start 
negotiations with the USA on an agreement on the elimination of tariffs on industrial 
products and an agreement on conformity assessment. Second, to sound areas of trade 
policy in which EU-US cooperation would be particularly effective given joint 
communications for a new transatlantic agenda presented after the last US elections by the 
EU-COM and the European External Action Service (EEAS) on December 2, 2020 
10
.    
 
According to the president of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW, Berlin), 
Marcel Fratzscher, a replacement for the failed TTIP agreement would strengthen Europe's 
position vis-à-vis China. In close consultations with Washington, Brussels should come to 
an agreement with the new US administration on how to deal with China. Therefore, the 
EU should rely on a new trade agreement with the USA in which the EU agrees on 
common standards that would then be globally binding. The best strategy for Europe 
would be to assert its interests in global system competition in a strong transatlantic 
partnership (DIE ZEIT, 2021).  
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 Related to Google searches for “Brexit” since October 2015.  
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Graph 18: potential Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)  
USA and EU-27   
  
Source: Ssolbergj, TTIP (Wikipedia)  
 
 
3.2 The socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the 
transatlantic Partnership   
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been characterized by European leaders as  Europe's biggest 
challenge since the Second World War (Archick et al, 2021). Although it did not affect 
transatlantic relations directly, it added political divergences to already existing grievances 
and tensions, e.g. on the International Criminal Court, the Paris Climate Agreement, the 
nuclear deal with  Iran and the relocation of the US  embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem (Arvanitopoulos, 2020). The corona not only intensified nationalist and 
protectionist policies but fuelled also the geopolitical rivalry between the global players China 
and America (Schmucker, 2020).   
 
Trump’s unlawful withdrawal from the WHO (Gostin, 2020) on May 29, 2020, fortunately, 
revoked later on by Joe Biden, as well as his refusal to join an international vaccine effort of 
more than 170 nations, endangered not only the health and security of Americans but of the 
whole world, given the limitations of nationalist answers to the global spread of the pandemic. 
Instead, to overcome the pandemic, the US and EU should develop a transatlantic strategy to 
guarantee an early containment and alleviation of the crisis, notably because of a current 
fourth wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Because the global spread of the virus is entangled 
inextricably with a response to other security challenges, like international migration and 
poverty alleviation, notably in Africa, this requires even stronger cooperation and a renewed 
sense of transatlantic solidarity between the two sides of the Atlantic (Arvanitopoulos, 2020). 
President Biden already pledged to enhance US-EU cooperation to defeat the pandemic and 
announced to contribute up to US$ 4 bn for COVAX, a worldwide WHO-led initiative aimed 
at equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines also in developing countries (Archick et al, 2021).   
 
Massive transhipping global problems, including the Transatlantic, seriously affected 
transatlantic retail trade. The pandemic lockdown suspended and reduced many economic 
activities and subsequently the volume of cargo being carried aboard container ships on the 
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North American and European retail trade (Valentine, 2020). Moreover, the already chaotic 
global container shipping market was hit since 12 August 2021, by the Corona induced 
suspension of container pick-up services at Zhoushan Port, the world's largest port in terms of 
cargo throughput. Also many major ports worldwide had been captured by the Delta variant 
virus and almost lost their ability to operate or risked trade abandonment like Chittagong, 
Bangladesh, responsible for more than 70 % of Bangladesh's cargo import and export. The 
same happened in other major South East Asian ports. Also, the US shipment was 
increasingly affected and the already extremely fragile global supply chain, e.g. in electronic 
chips, was burning hot.  
 
The socio-economic impact of the pandemic on the EU and the US has been devasting. It had 
far-reaching political, social, and economic consequences beyond public health (Archick et al, 
2021). Both partners need each other more than ever to cope with the covid crisis. Enhanced 
transatlantic cooperation to strengthen resilience would be required also in closely related 
areas of international relations, namely by an EU–US and UK–US trade agreement, a Visa 
Waiver Program, guarantees of Europe’s energy security, 5G technology and a joint EU-US 





Economists and economic literature agree that Brexit is likely to harm the UK's economy, 
including a significant decrease in the UK's real per capita income in the medium and long 
run. In contrast, proponents of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, like Premier Boris 
Johnson, promise a glorious future and a ‘titanic success’. Whether Brexit will also impact 
'Global Britain in a Competitive Age’, including its former colonies, is open to question as 
well. London continued to follow its high flying ambitions, not just concerning the CANZUK 
union, meant to replace the lost EU-market access, but also vis à vis India and other big global 
players of the Commonwealth as well as the USA. However, the prospects of these ambitious 
projects are questionable.   
 
A particularly sensible case is the combined impact of Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic on 
the US and future transatlantic relations. From a global perspective, the problem is less the 
socio-economic impact on individual countries and relations concerned, e.g. the UK, EU, US 
and the Transatlantic, but the overall geopolitical repercussions of Brexit in times of the 
Corona crisis. The US, the UK and the Western alliance, in general, run the risk of losing their 
vested global political and economic influence hitherto focussed on the Transatlantic. Given 
the fierce competition between major global players like the US, UK, EU and China, Brexit 
reinforces already existing tendencies that redounds to the advantage of a shift of their 
traditional hegemony in the sphere of transatlantic relations to the Asian-Pacific realm of 
power. Brexit thus may trigger a domino effect of populist nationalism in the West that will 
weaken in the medium and long run its geopolitical power position.  
 
In short, Brexit is likely to harm not only the British. The post-Brexit impact on the US and 
transatlantic relations will be negative too, but probably only be felt in the medium and long 
term as well. However, the direct and indirect negative effects of the global COVID-19 crisis 
will by far outdo the Brexit impact.  
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Résumé: Le renouveau mondial du nationalisme économique et du protectionnisme constitue 
une menace sérieuse pour l'orientation de la politique internationale du commerce extérieur vers 
les principes de l'économie de marché de l'OMC. Les économistes s'accordent à dire que le 
Brexit nuira considérablement à l'économie britannique à moyen et long terme. En outre, ses 
effets politiques et économiques endommageront également les États-Unis et les relations 
transatlantiques. Le Premier ministre britannique Boris Johnson, quant à lui, continue d'affirmer 
que la sortie de l'UE permettra à la Grande-Bretagne de « reprendre le contrôle ». De plus, les 
effets socio-économiques de la COVID-19 pandémie sur les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, 
l'UE et les relations transatlantiques sont dévastateurs. Elle a des conséquences politiques, 
sociales et économiques de grande envergure qui vont bien au-delà de la santé publique. Tous 
les partenaires ont plus que jamais besoin les uns des autres pour faire face à la crise du Covid. 
Une plus grande coopération transatlantique pour renforcer la résilience serait également 




Zusammenfassung : Die weltweite Wiederbelebung des wirtschaftlichen Nationalismus und 
des Protektionismus stellt eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die international 
außenwirtschaftspolitische Orientierung an den Prinzipien der Marktwirtschaft dar. Populärer 
Wirtschaftsnationalismus wie Trumpismus, Brexit oder die Abschottung der osteuropäischen 
Visegrád-Staaten gegen Einwanderer verstößt gegen grundlegende Prinzipien der WTO. Die 
Ökonomen sind sich einig, dass der Brexit der britischen Wirtschaft mittel und langfristig 
erheblich schaden wird. Darüber hinaus werden seine politischen und wirtschaftlichen 
Auswirkungen auch den USA und den transatlantischen Beziehungen schaden. Der britische 
Premier Boris Johnson behauptet dagegen nach wie vor, dass der Austritt aus der EU 
Großbritannien in die Lage versetzen wird, „die Kontrolle zurückzugewinnen“. Außerdem sind 
die sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen der Corona-Krise auf die USA, Großbritannien, die EU 
und die transatlantischen Beziehungen verheerend. Sie hat weitreichende politische, soziale und 
wirtschaftliche Folgen, die weit über die öffentliche Gesundheit hinausgehen. Alle Partner 
brauchen einander mehr denn je, um die Covid-Krise zu bewältigen. Auch in eng verwandten 
Bereichen der internationalen Beziehungen und Sicherheitsfragen wäre eine verstärkte 
transatlantische Zusammenarbeit zur Stärkung der Resilienz erforderlich. 
 
 
 
